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THE DRUG WAR: ARE WE WINNING OR LOSING?

by

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June 1996

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TITLE	PAGE
TITLE PAGE	i
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ii
LIST OF TABLES	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
INTRODUCTION	1
How Did We Get Here?	1
Chronology of Counterdrug Events	2
The State Of The Union	5
National Perspective	7
Department of Defense's Role	8
In the Countries That Are Sources of Drugs	8
In Drug Pipelines From Source to the U.S.	9
In Distribution Networks in the U.S.	10
Determining Accomplishments	11
Recommendations: Hope Springs Eternal	13
Recommendations:	14
ENDNOTES	15
BIBLIOGRAPHY	17

LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	PAGE
1 Alcohol, Tobacco, Substance Abuse	6
2 DoD Costs (1990-95-Actual)1996 Projected	11
3 Texas National Guard Counterdrug Costs (1989-1996)	13

ABSTRACT

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Although the United States only has 4-5% of the earth's population, we consume nearly 50% of the world's production of cocaine. Since President Reagan first declared a "war on drugs" on 14 October 1982, that was reaffirmed by President Bush and again by President Clinton, the United States, and its military forces, have continually experienced an uphill battle against reducing the supply of drugs coming into and within the United States. The military is doing a commendable job in performing its mission but dealing with the supply end of the drug equation alone will not yield success. How we deal with this issue requires a multijurisdictional approach. Success means more programs for demand-reduction, prevention, along with supply reduction. We also must establish criteria determining success. This political football needs a new coach, uniforms and larger playing field.

INTRODUCTION

Since President Bush declared in his first national television address in 1989 that he was launching an American "war" on drugs, the availability and consumption of illegal drugs in the United States have increased. Proof of this fact is borne in the rise in the percentage of newborns, junior high and senior high students addicted to or abusing drugs. The adult population, since 1992, seems to be the only group to plateau in its level of substance abuse. Given these grim statistics, how can we expect, even with the Department of Defense's able assistance, to win the skirmishes, let alone the war on drugs?

In order to be considered a "war," this issue requires active and pervasive assistance from all sections of our society, otherwise we are merely dealing with skirmishes. We must do more, or more of, whatever we are presently doing. We also must invent a way to determine counterdrug effectiveness in verifiable and measurable terms.

Substance abuse is a cancer that is clearly eating away at the fabric of American society. It is a societal issue that all of us must seriously embrace in order to defeat. As President Clinton stated, while speaking to world leaders at the United Nations' 50th anniversary celebration in August 1995, "We must win this battle together," conveying to the world community that this is not just a problem for the United States, but everyone.

How Did We Get Here?

"...While some strategic thinkers debate whether forces should be withdrawn from Europe and concentrated against "out-of-area" threats in the developing world, others wonder about the utility of military force in general, since the threats to America may now come not from nuclear weapons but from environmental hazards, drugs, and the loss of economic competitiveness."

Paul Kennedy¹

In 1996, what does the United States' report card tell us with regard to the issues raised by Paul Kennedy? First, the United States seems to be winning its struggle to save the environment. Over the past twenty years, many of our streams, rivers, ponds and lakes have been brought back to nearly pristine conditions as the result of fervent federal and state regulatory efforts to restrict pollutants and manage clean water as well as air quality. Although the environment is not perfect, we are heading in the right direction. Second, on the economic competitiveness front, according to the latest economic indicators, the United States now, for the past two fiscal years of 1993 and 1994, leads the world

as the most competitive country again—surpassing our one-time nemesis Japan! Lastly, after spending billions of dollars in the fight to eradicate drugs coming into and within the United States, we have to pause and wonder, are we winning the war on drugs? Is the United States and its military doing everything possible to win the war? Is it even possible to win? How do we know whether we have won? What are the criteria to determine such a thing? Has the drug issue taken on skirmish level characteristics? Before I attempt to answer any of the above questions, I will review the general history of events that has affected the disposition of drugs and its intervention in the United States.

Chronology of Drug Related Events (From 1878-1995)

The intent of this chronology is to familiarize the reader with the present state of drug administration in the United States by showing significant political and social changes and initiations over the past 117 years. Although the major emphasis of this chronology is concentrated on the supply side of the drug interdiction efforts, some reference is made to the demand side in the later years.

1878—Posse Comitatus Act is signed into law by then Republican President Rutherford B. Hayes. This law prohibited the military from becoming directly or actively involved with enforcing civil laws. The action of the military after the Civil War prompted this inherent distrust of the military in civilian affairs.

1914—Drugs known to produce addiction becomes subject to stricter control as a result of the Harrison Narcotic Act.

1938—Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act provides for legal standards for composition and preparation of drugs found in the United States. The Food and Drug Administration is responsible for determining safety and efficacy of all new drugs.

1957—Narcotics Control Act supplements and strengthens the Harrison Narcotic Act of 1914.

1962—The 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act is amended by strengthening the Food and Drug Administration control over new drugs.

1973—Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) is established as an agency of the Department of Justice, merging the functions of four separate drug law enforcement agencies. The primary task of the agency is to reduce the supply of illicit drugs produced domestically or entering the U.S. from abroad. DEA also regulates the legal trade in narcotic and dangerous drugs, manages a national narcotics intelligence system, and works with other agencies to support drug traffic prevention.

1981—A change to Title 10, U.S. Code, reduces many restrictions to the Posse Comitatus Act and authorizes military support to drug law enforcement agencies. This support has five key stipulations:

1. The military may loan equipment, facilities, and people.
2. Military personnel may operate equipment used in monitoring and communicating the movement of air and sea traffic.
3. Military personnel may operate military equipment in support of law enforcement agencies in an interdiction role overseas only if a joint declaration of emergency exists... (as agreed upon by key executive cabinet members).
4. The military may not conduct searches or make arrests. Note, most of these restrictions do not apply to the National Guard or Coast Guard, leaving them free to aid local anti-drug efforts. However, for all practical purposes, as a matter of policy, National Guard forces providing counterdrug support generally follow the same restrictions as federal forces and do not directly perform law enforcement functions.
5. Use of the military may not adversely affect readiness.²

1982—Concurrent jurisdiction over drug offenses is given to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and DEA. Agents of the two organizations work together on drug law enforcement, and DEA's administrator reports to the director of the FBI. DEA has offices nationwide and in more than 40 foreign countries. In recent years it has worked extensively in Central and South American countries.

1982—On October 14, President Reagan announces a war on drugs.

1983—Crack, or crystallized cocaine, that can be smoked to produce a short but intensive high, is developed by drug traffickers, probably Dominicans, in the Bahamas and soon appear in West Coast U.S. cities. The low priced, highly addictive drug opens a mass market for cocaine among adolescents and young adults, increasing crime rates, devastating families and communities, and multiplying health emergencies and the incidence of syphilis and AIDS as users engage in indiscriminate sex.

1983—In October, using the slogan "Just Say No," First Lady Nancy Reagan unveils a new program to combat drug abuse. This program is directed toward grade school children. Federal monies are allotted to fund this initiative.

1983—Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE), a cooperative effort of local enforcement agencies and school departments is started in Los Angeles, California. The purpose of the program is to reduce the number of students, generally in grades four through eight, who start their involvement in drug activities.

1988—On September 30, along with the 1989 Defense Authorization Act, the role of the military in drug interdiction increased. An amendment

is passed that, in effect, requires the President to "substantially halt" the flow of drugs across the borders within 45 days. The law requires the President to order the military (including the National Guard and Reserves) to begin complete night radar coverage of the entire southern border, to seize planes or boats smuggling drugs and to arrest the crew. This Act also assigned three major responsibilities to the DoD:

1. Act as the single lead agency for detecting and monitoring the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United States.
2. Integrate U.S. command, control, communications, and technical intelligence assets that are dedicated to the interdiction of illegal drugs entering the United States into an effective communications network.
3. Approve and fund state governors' plans for using the National Guard to support the operations of drug law enforcement agencies.

1988—In late October, Congress imposes a Comprehensive Anti-Drug Bill whose laws impose tough penalties for both selling and using drugs. It also seconds the requirement for the military to join in the drug interdiction effort. The following include the other six significant anti-drug provisions:

1. Permit the death penalty for those convicted in federal courts of drug-related killings.
2. Establish a civil fine of as much as \$10,000 for those caught with even small amounts of drugs—including marijuana and cocaine.
3. Allow courts to deny certain federal benefits to convicted drug offenders. Benefits include: federal retirement, welfare, health, disability, and veteran's programs.
4. Create a Drug Czar with a cabinet level office. The Drug Czar would draw up budget requests and be primarily responsible for the war on drugs. The law dismantles Vice President Bush's National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). The law specifically states that the Drug Czar may not hold another administrative position. In March, William Bennett is confirmed by the Senate for this position.
5. Provide an additional \$484.8 million on top of that \$4 billion that already has been appropriated.
6. Combat money laundering by strengthening record keeping and creating record reporting requirements by banks. Banks not cooperating would be blocked from participating in any U.S. dollar clearing or wire transfer system.³

1989—On September 5, President Bush names former Secretary of Education William J. Bennett to be Director of National Drug Control Policy and uses his first presidential address to announce a war on drugs.

1989—DoD Authorization Act expands the role of the National Guard in support of Law Enforcement Agencies (LEAs).

1990—DoD Authorization Act further directs the U.S. Armed Forces, to the maximum extent possible, to conduct military training in drug interdiction areas. The designation of high intensity drug trafficking areas (HIDTAs) further clarifies the military support to LEAs.

1995—President Clinton, while speaking to world leaders at the United Nations 50th anniversary celebration, calls for a crackdown on international drug smugglers, and announces that the United States will "freeze assets of Columbia's biggest cocaine cartel and punish countries that tolerate laundering." He goes on to say "We must win the battle together." At about the same time and with the help of the CIA and DEA, the Colombian police arrests six of seven leaders of the Cali Mafia, notorious drug trafficking organization that controlled 80% of the world's cocaine market and almost 33% of its heroin production.⁴

1996—President Clinton, in his Presidential State of the Union Address on January 23, 1996, names General McCaffrey as the new drug czar for the United States. The President notes the General's past war record and decorations as proof of his eminent qualifications.

The State of The Union

"Under the leadership of President George Bush, there is now recognition that the drug problem is not just for the department alone to fight. He knows that the only way to deal with it is to combine interdiction with treatment, education, prevention and enhanced law enforcement."

Secretary of Defense Richard B.Cheney⁵

On October 2, 1995, The American Health Foundation issued its 1995 Child Health Report Card which graded the health and health behavior of the nation's children with a "D," falling from a "C-" grade given in 1993 and 1994. The table below depicts one of the 16 health indicators in the American Health Foundation Report Card⁶:

Table 1
Alcohol, Tobacco, & Substance Abuse

	1991	1992	1993	1994
Cigarettes				
% daily use by high school seniors in last 30 days	18.5	17.0	19.0	19.4
Cocaine				
% daily use by high school seniors in last 12 months	3.5	3.0	3.3	3.6
Crack				
% daily use by high school seniors in last 12 months	1.5	1.5	1.5	1.9
Marijuana				
% daily use by high school seniors in last 12 months	23.9	22.0	26.0	30.9
Alcohol				
% high school seniors having 5 or more drinks at 1 time in past 2 weeks	29.8	28.0	27.5	28.2

Marijuana use by black males as young as 11 has tripled in four years. For white girls, it has more than doubled. And teens who carry guns or join gangs are more likely to use cocaine. With this bleak statistical backdrop, President Clinton, in a speech before the Community Anti-Drug Coalition of America, stated, "This is madness, pure and simple. And we all have to do whatever we can to get it out of our lives."⁷ The prognosis for the future doesn't look particularly good, as Institute President Thomas Gleaton states: "With illegal drug usage by high school students climbing over eight years and hovering near 35 percent, overall teen use will, in three or four years, reach 1979's all-time high of 51 percent."⁸

The University of Michigan's results of their survey released on December 15, 1995 confirms the fact that the use of drugs among secondary school students rose again in 1995, continuing a trend that began in 1991 among eighth-grade students, and in 1992 among 10th and 12th graders.⁹ "While these levels of illicit drug use are certainly reason for concern," observes researcher Lloyd D. Johnson, "it should be noted that they are still well below the peak levels attained in the 1970's. We are in a relapse phase in the longer-term epidemic, if you will, but it is certainly not something over which society is powerless. Our

greatest progress in the past at lowering rates of illicit drug use among our young people is proof of that."¹⁰ To illustrate, between 1979 and 1992, the proportion of 12th-graders reporting using any illicit drugs in the prior 12 months prior to the survey fell in half, from 54 percent to 27 percent.

As harsh as the figures of the United States' high school senior population seem, we cannot really take solace in the fact that the younger generation will be turning this trend around anytime soon. According to the survey of 200,000 students in 32 states, "it was found that marijuana use in grades six through eight increased during the 1994-95 school year. It measured 13.3 percent for black males for a 195 percent increase over the 1991-92 report, 6.7 percent for black females, a 253 percent increase over four years, and 7.2 percent for white females, a 118 percent relative increase."¹¹ What is really scary is that this tendency is rearing its ugly head in traditionally rural areas such as the state of Maine. The University of Maine research results¹² attest to the fact that even rural communities are experiencing the issues found in larger communities.

We clearly see that our younger population has not been successful in dealing with the drug issue, what marks can we give the adults? They don't seem to be doing much better! Last year alone, Americans purchased \$70 billion worth of illegal drugs; in fact, since President Bush declared in his first national television address in 1989 that he was launching an American "war" on drugs, the availability and consumption of illegal drugs in the United States has increased.¹³

Additionally, "The White House Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) estimates there are 2.7 million "hard core" drug users—those most likely to commit crimes to obtain drugs—in America today. This is more than triple the estimated number five years ago. Casual drug use among all Americans has remained constant since 1992, according to the 1994 National Household Survey on Drug Abuse, but it is rising sharply among teenagers. The study reports that twice as many 12 to 17 year olds smoked marijuana in 1994 as in 1992."¹⁴

Even the effects of drugs reach newborns, "... the amount of drugs Americans consume; according to one estimate, the United States—with 4 to 5 percent of the world's population—consumes 50 percent of the world's cocaine." Such addictions strain health-care services, and not simply in the treatment of adults; in 1989 alone, approximately 375,000 Americans were *born* addicted to drugs, mainly cocaine and heroin.¹⁵

National Perspective

According to an August 1994 CBS poll, many federal counterdrug initiatives have been successful in arresting drug kingpins and seizing drugs but still nearly three-quarters of the American public think the Drug War is a failure.¹⁶

Drug policy reformers such as Baltimore Mayor Kurt Schmoke argue that the federal effort "has not borne fruit; that is, it has not made the United States even close to drug free. Millions of Americans continue to violate our drug laws

every year by using or selling illegal drugs." Agency heads say that the fruit of their anti-drug programs is to be found in the small picture. "To those who say we've spent \$100 billion, what do we have to show for it," says David Mactas, director of the Center for Substance Abuse Treatment at the Department of Health and Human Services, "I say tens of thousands of lives restored to people, some of whom are now legislators, judges, counselors, bus drivers."¹⁷

More recent public opinion surveys reiterate the concern expressed in the 1994 CBS study. In an exclusive Knight-Ridder Washington Bureau national opinion survey¹⁸ reported in February 1996, it was related that 78 percent of voters said crime and drugs were the most important problems out of the fifteen cited by pollsters. While the Knight-Ridder survey reflects the mood of the nation, the *Austin American-Statesman* readers were asked to fill out a questionnaire in the January 28, 1996.¹⁹ They were asked to rank some of the problems we face today. Confirming the national survey, the Austin, Texas survey rated crime and drugs as the most important problem at 68 percent.

Both locally and nationally, crime and drugs is considered the single most important problem in the United States today. What is the Department of Defense doing to help end this problem?

Department of Defense's Role

"Our specific mission is to protect national security. There can be no doubt that international trafficking in drugs is a national security problem for the United States. Therefore, detecting and countering the production, trafficking of illegal drugs is a high priority, national security mission of the Department of Defense."

Secretary of Defense Richard B.Cheney²⁰

How does the United States Department of Defense (DoD) attack the issue of drug abuse? An effective attack on the flow of illegal drugs requires action at every level: (1) in the countries that are sources of drugs, (2) in the drug pipelines from source countries to the United States, and (3) in distribution networks in the United States. U.S. military forces can assist in the attack on the supply of drugs in each of these phases.²¹

In the Countries that are Sources of Drugs

DoD provides advice, equipment and training to cooperating nations, such as Colombia and the Andean countries, in fighting the production and export of illegal drugs. The U.S. Department of State coordinates and is responsible for counter-drug assistance to other nations. Assistance, when requested, is provided

to U.S. law enforcement agencies working with the law enforcement, military, and other agencies of foreign countries.²²

A prime example of providing assistance to source nations, specifically Colombia, was seen in the summer of 1995.

"...Colombian police arrested six of seven leaders of the Cali mafia, a notorious drug-trafficking organization that controlled 80 percent of the world's cocaine market and almost one-third of its heroin production." "The help of the CIA was fundamental," stated General Rosso Serano, the director of the Colombian officials. "The CIA had supplied Colombian officials with telephone monitoring devices and had flown surveillance missions to trace the movement of the traffickers. The Drug Enforcement Administration had helped to gather intelligence and plan operations. In September, the DEA persuaded the Cali mafia's chief administrative officer, an insider expected to provide details about the organization's trade routes, security and communications, to surrender to U.S. authorities."²³

Although the United States assisted in **planning** the mission with the Colombian government, U.S. personnel do not participate in mission execution or when hostilities may result. Mobile training teams help train foreign personnel in military skills such as patrolling, tracking and planning operations.

Another standard way of assisting source countries that are cooperating nations is to provide tactical analysis teams, known as TATs. These teams are found in the U.S. embassies and consist of U.S. intelligence experts and analysts who compile intelligence from all available sources subsequent to and during operations. In some instances, U.S. Air Force AWACS and U.S. Customs P-3 aircrafts have assisted foreign nations in conducting anti-drug operations.

In Drug Pipelines from Source Countries to the United States

DoD's primary roles in drug interdiction in the pipelines from the source countries to the United States involve the Caribbean and southern U.S. border. Land, air, sea and satellite systems provide vital information for assisting in the tracking of illicit drugs traveling these corridors.

"Resources devoted to detect and identify aircraft and ships suspected of carrying drugs include U.S. Navy vessels on patrol (some carrying Coast Guard law enforcement detachments), Air Force and Army ground-based radars, and U.S. Air Force airborne radar and interceptor aircraft. Military forces also conduct reconnaissance along the US border using aircraft, patrols, observation posts, and remote sensors to support U.S. law enforcement agencies requesting such support. The military passes the detection and monitoring results on to law enforcement agencies for the possible apprehension of smugglers."²⁴

In Distribution Networks in the United States

One of the main sources of support for counterdrug (CD) activities by DoD coordinates through joint task forces. Joint Task Force Six (JTF-6) comprises elements of the Departments of the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Marines. JTF-6 is committed to providing responsive, quality professional support to enforcement agencies. Stated in its operational support planning guide, JTF-6's mission is to plan and coordinate all DoD (Title 10, Active and Reserve) military CD support that is requested by federal, state and local enforcement agencies (LEAs) within the continental United States (CONUS), Puerto Rico and the American Virgin Islands. Forces Command (FORSCOM) is the higher operational headquarters of JTF-6. The Commanding General (CG), FORS COM can approve most CD missions; however, he has chosen to delegate 19 to CG, JTF-6 the authority to approve mobile training teams (MTTs), transportation requests, intelligence analyst support within CONUS, linguist support and missions with the Rapid Support Unit (RSU).²⁵

The Regional Logistic Support Office (RLSO) works with LEAs to provide non-operational support such as the transfer of military property. There are four RLSOs located at Atlanta, Georgia; Buffalo, New York; Fort Bliss, Texas; Long Beach, California. The RLSO at Fort Bliss, Texas collocates with Operation Alliance and JTF-6.

In reviewing the JTF-6's concept of military support, we see the JTF-6's military support is designed to assist LEAs in their mission to detect, deter, disrupt and dismantle illegal drug trafficking organizations. JTF-6 support serves as a force multiplier to law enforcement agencies with the potential to enhance LEA effectiveness or to release LEA resources to focus on interdiction and seizure actions. The Total Force results in joint (LEA and military) operations involving Title 10 and Title 32 (National Guard) personnel and non-operational assets from the RLSO to provide a variety of enhanced capabilities to supported LEAs.

Operation Alliance, collocated with JTF-6 in El Paso, Texas, reviews all requests for military support from the Southwest border HIDTA, coordinates the efforts of federal, state and local agencies; and determines the appropriate military agency to provide the support. State National Guard counterdrug coordinators receive and review requests from their state for military support, and coordinate and approve these requests within their capabilities.²⁶

JTF-6's support to LEAs is categorized as operational (military units providing tactical support through the execution of mission related training); general support (augmentation of LEAs with military specific skills, training, transportation, etc.); engineer (horizontal and vertical construction; road and range repair, etc.); intelligence (linguists, analysts, imagery, etc.); and Rapid Support Unit rapid response to actionable intelligence from LEAs.

Determining Accomplishments

After spending billions of dollars since 1991 (see Table 2 below), the United States government, along with the Department of Defense²⁷, has been accused of not providing appropriate data to prove to citizens that it is spending our tax dollars wisely.

Table 2
Department of Defense Counterdrug Budget
(1991-1996)

1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
\$1.057B	\$1.226B	\$1.141B	\$815M	\$840M	\$815M

Source: Department of Defense,
February, 1996.

In a Fall, 1994 *Cato Journal* article, Christopher Schnaubelt states, "...due to the lack of demonstrated results, the DoD's role in the nation's counterdrug effort is also drawing an increasing volume of fire from policy wonks and congressman."²⁸ The *Los Angeles Times* reported an interview with Attorney General Janet Reno who expressed doubt about the DoD's methodology, relating, "It's time that we start and come up with hard data that deals with the issue of whether or not interdiction is efficient and effective."²⁹

It is nearly impossible, or at best very difficult, to provide a definitive answer to the question, "Is the country getting its money's worth for what it spends on military counterdrug operations?" "It will never be feasible to say that devoting *X* numbers of DoD counterdrug dollars result in a *Y* reduction of drug abuse-there are simply too many intervening variables. This lack of proof for a causal relationship should not be surprising; the interaction between civilian law enforcement and crime also remains ambiguous. Yet, the problem is worth considering because in many respects the question of military counterdrug effectiveness reflects the difficulty of assessing other aspects of drug policy."³⁰

Many go as far as believe that we can never stop the drug flow effectively. "Stopping the drug flow is like stopping the tide... The two goals of the "international supply reduction" strategy-creating a physical shortage of cocaine (and) increasing its import price enough to force consumption down (cannot be achieved)."³¹ Communist China has attempted for centuries to achieve this phenomenon with little results.

Others in the drug fight feel the "war" has never really been fought. The director of the Drug Enforcement Administration Thomas Constantine states, "I

don't think the war (on drugs) has ever been fought.... The best I can see, he says, "it took us 30 years to get into this. It might take us 10 to 15 years to get out."³²

Dr. Lee Brown, director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP) states the 1995 drug policy emphasizes education and treatment rather than prosecution and punishment as a way out of the drug dilemma. Many policy makers agree with Lee Brown's approach, including Attorney General Janet Reno. The Attorney General has spoken against mandatory minimum sentences for drug offenders, criticizing them for "filling prisons with small-time drug offenders when space is needed for violent criminals."³³

Looking toward education and treatment is not the only answer; proper funding must be considered. Congress has repeatedly denied the Clinton White House appropriate funding for drug control programs. An example of thwarted attempts by the administration to successfully fund drug related programs from Congress were the treatment program funding request of \$355 million and Congressional approval of only \$57 million. The administration also requested \$100 million to be spent on drug courts in fiscal 1995 in the 1994 Crime Act, but Congress only appropriated \$11.9 million. "Unfortunately, as drug reformers see it, that means more programs that don't work."³⁴

Despite the gloom and doom expressed by those policy makers and reformists noted above, there are drug related programs that work and have measurable results. The El Paso military Joint Task Force Six has made a concerted effort over the past few years to satisfy and silence the critics. JTF-6 has summarized their activities in measurable terms, to include value-added computations in the areas of: (1) engineering; (2) education and schooling; (3) amount/type of seizures of drugs and (4) property seized through the assets forfeiture program; (5) indictments made; and (6) Local Enforcement Agency (LEA) and Rapid Support Unit (RSU) measure of effectiveness (MOE).

According to the latest intelligence, JTF-6 is making a significant impact in keeping drugs out of the United States through the Mexican border states. In the February 26, 1996, *Time* magazine article "Caribbean Blizzard," the center of the Caribbean drug trade is the "new Miami"—Puerto Rico. "Since 1990 Puerto Rico has been the focal point for the exportation of cocaine to the mainland" states Felix Jimenez, DEA head in Puerto Rico. Because Puerto Rico is a U.S. possession, only cursory U.S. Customs checks are made when Puerto Ricans enter the U.S. "Once a shipment is smuggled onto the island, it can easily be relayed to American cities."³⁵ It is significant to note that JTF-6's first full year in operation was 1990!

The National Guard has made efforts throughout the country to stem the drug tide by establishing drug demand reduction programs and allocating monies to individual states to manage and coordinate these programs.

The Texas National Guard, through its counterdrug Task Force Commander,³⁶ has made extensive strides in working with JTF-6, Operation Alliance, and its community based drug demand reduction programs. The budget for this effort is seen below in Table 3:

Table 3
Texas National Guard Counterdrug Support Program

Year	1989	1990	1991	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996
Man Days	100	300	300	350	400	450	400	355
Budget	\$2.4M	\$12M	\$12.7M	\$15.1M	\$17.6M	\$17.0M	\$11.0M	\$9.9M

Source: Texas National Guard,
February, 1996.

The Texas National Guard Drug Demand Reduction Program was established to support statewide community efforts in drug use and prevention. Through its efforts, the Drug Demand Reduction Office seeks to organize National Guard resources, members and their families in support of drug abuse prevention programs in the community.³⁷

Recommendations: Hope Springs Eternal

"We are not going to solve the drug use in this country through interdiction alone, through cutting off the supply alone. And a larger component of this solution lies in education, and in the whole demand side of the equation: law enforcement at home—these things."

President George Bush³⁸

Early in President Bush's administration he stated:

"I think the elimination of drugs is going to stem from vigorous change in the society's approach to narcotics. It's going to be successful only if our education is successful. The answer to the problem of drugs lies more on solving the demand side of the equation than it does on the supply side, than it does on interdiction or sealing the borders or something of that nature. And so, it is going to have to be a major educational effort, and the private sector and the schools are all going to have to be involved in this."³⁹

Secretary of Health and Human Services Donna Shalala in a February 18, 1996 *Parade* article "What We Can do About Drugs" is more demanding on her

approach, "We must send a clear message to all Americans: drugs are illegal, dangerous, unhealthy and wrong."⁴⁰

Recommendations:

1. Everyone must become involved! This includes civilians as well as the military personnel. Celebrities, sports figures, police and local enforcement agencies help, but everyone must take stock in the African saying, "It takes a village to raise a child." Unless we all take this issue seriously, our future, our children's future, will be lost to drugs.
2. The military can and should continue to assist in drug interdiction in the areas outlined previously. They must continue to strive to establish a method of measuring quantifiable results. These results must be acceptable and understood by the politicians and the public.
3. The active military must become readily involved in local issues involving youth and related activities (for example, the National Guard has several programs that the active components could use as examples).
4. Lastly, the politicians must seriously consider the drug issue a threat to the stability and well-being of the United States. Substance abuse is a cancer that is clearly eating away at the fabric of American society. It is a societal issue that will require all of us to seriously embrace to defeat. President Clinton stated, while speaking to world leaders at the United Nations' 50th anniversary celebration in August 1995, "We must win this battle together," conveying to the world community that this is not just a problem for the United States but everyone in the world.

I want to end my paper with a quotation by LTC. Robert Wade that ended a similar paper at the Air War College. His sentiments best reflect my thoughts concerning this issue:

"After much research and thought, I believe that the drug war is indeed winnable. However, the military cannot win that war; it can only make a modest contribution. Victory will be achieved when the hearts and minds of Americans are committed to end their drug demand. And that victory will probably require the investment of thousands of lives, billions of dollars, gallons of tears, and many years."⁴¹

ENDNOTES

- ¹ Paul Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, New York: Random House, Inc., 1993, 292.
- ² Michael H. Abbott, "The Army and the Drug War: Politics or National Security?" *Parameters*, December 1988, 100.
- ³ Bill Dickerson, U. S. Congressman, "Anti-Drug Package Uses Dickerson Amendment," *Dickerson Reports to the People*, August 1988, 1.
- ⁴ Samantha Stainburn, "Drug Bust," *Government Executive*, November 1995, 48.
- ⁵ Richard B. Cheney, "DoD Role in Drug Control." Interview. *DISAM Journal*, vol. 12, Winter, 1989-90, 39.
- ⁶ American Health Foundation, "1995 Report Card," New York, NY, October 1995, 1.
- ⁷ "Clinton Plans Talks to Fight Teen Drug Use," *Austin American Statesman*, November 1995, A7.
- ⁸ Ibid.
- ⁹ Lloyd Johnston, Jerald Bachman, Patrick O'Malley, "Monitoring The Future Study," University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, December 1995, 1.
- ¹⁰ Ibid., 4.
- ¹¹ "Clinton Plans Talks to Fight Teen Drug Use." A7.
- ¹² Robert Q. Dana, "Study: Pot, Booze Widely Used by Teens," *Lewiston Sun-Journal*, Lewiston, ME, October 1995, A8.
- ¹³ Stainburn, "Drug Bust," 49.
- ¹⁴ Ibid., 49-50.
- ¹⁵ Kennedy, *Preparing for the Twenty-First Century*, 294.
- ¹⁶ Stainburn, "Drug Bust," 52.
- ¹⁷ Ibid.
- ¹⁸ Angie Cannon, "The Mood of America," *Austin American-Statesman*, Austin, TX, February 1996, D1.
- ¹⁹ Ibid.
- ²⁰ Dick Cheney, "DoD in its Role in its War on Drugs," *Defense*, November-December, 1989, 3.
- ²¹ Ibid.
- ²² R.E. Harmon et al., "Counterdrug Assistance: The Number One Priority," *Military Review* 73, March 1993, 26-35.
- ²³ Stainburn, "Drug Bust," 48.
- ²⁴ Christopher M. Schnaubelt, "Can the Military's Effectiveness in the Drug War be Measured?" *Cato Journal*, vol. 14, no. 2, Fall 1994, 246.
- ²⁵ Roger F. Mathews, U. S. Army, Joint Task Force Six, J3 Operation, interviewed by author, Ft. Bliss, El Paso, TX, November 1995.
- ²⁶ Ibid.
- ²⁷ Department of Defense, Office of Drug Program and Budget, phone interview by author with Chris Lin, civilian assistant, February 1996.
- ²⁸ Schnaubelt, "Can the Military's Role in the Drug War be Measured," 243.
- ²⁹ R. J. Ostrow, "Reno Questions Funding of Drug Interdiction Efforts," *Los Angeles Times*, May 1993, A2.
- ³⁰ Schnaubelt, "Can the Military's Role in the Drug War be Measured?," 244.
- ³¹ Mark Kleiman, "Snowed In," *The New Republic*, April 1990, 14-16.
- ³² Stainburn, "Drug Bust," 50.
- ³³ Ibid., 52.
- ³⁴ Ibid.
- ³⁵ Cathy Booth, "Caribbean Blizzard." *Time*, New York, Time Life Inc., February 1996, 46.
- ³⁶ Gladys Tinsley, U. S. ARNG, Texas Counterdrug Task Force Commander, interviewed by author, Camp Mabry, Austin, TX, October 1995 and January 1996.
- ³⁷ Christian J. von Wupperfeld, Drug Demand Reduction Coordinator, Texas National Guard, interviewed by author, Camp Mabry, Austin, TX, February 1996.
- ³⁸ President George Bush, "Administration of George Bush, 1989," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, vol. 25, no. 4, January 1989, 128.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Secretary of Health and Welfare Donna Shalala, "What We can Do About Drugs," Parade, New York, Parade Publications, February 1996, 10.

⁴¹ Robert W. Wade, "The Military's Role in Drug Interdiction Is Headed for Failure," Air War College, Maxwell Air Force Base, AL, May 1989, 62.

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